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Data Centre Investment in Southeast Asia: Approvals Have Replaced Capital as the Constraint

· 5 min read · Nucky Poedjiardjo, Managing Partner

Data Centre Investment in Southeast Asia: Approvals Have Replaced Capital as the Constraint

For most of the last five years, the question in data centre development was who could raise the capital and secure the chips. In November 2026 alone, five jurisdictions announced measures that change the question. The binding constraint is no longer money or hardware. It is permission.

What changed in a single week

Singapore. From 19 November, advanced chips going to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Brazil require a US export licence. Firms with a US-headquartered parent can be exempt if they meet the reporting rules, but limits still apply to facilities supplying significant compute to China-headquartered firms. MDDI and METI say they are studying the rule and engaging industry, and Minister Josephine Teo has since discussed trusted access with US officials.

Malaysia. Trade minister Johari said operators must comply or should not operate in Malaysia, and all 117 approved projects will be notified once the US formally sets out the requirements. Parliament also heard that data centres must keep at least two days of water storage, on top of the 30 percent local content rule for new projects.

Thailand. The Commerce Ministry is reviewing how the US rule affects chip imports, leasing and cloud services. The Cabinet has approved a framework limiting data centres of 20MW or more to industrial estates, with projects routed through a One Stop Service and a screening committee overseen by MDES.

Indonesia. The government is reviewing the US rule, and a draft regulation would classify data centres by IT load, placing new facilities of 3MW and above in special economic zones or industrial estates.

Norway. On 9 November, grid operator Statnett temporarily halted new data centre grid-connection reservations pending a government licensing framework. Data centres accounted for roughly 75 percent of the 26GW of new connection capacity requested this year.

Each of these adds approval and compliance time to a programme. None of them adds megawatts.

The mature markets are running out of room, not demand

Singapore has about 1.46GW of live data centre capacity and only around 20MW under construction against a far larger pipeline. That gap is not a demand problem. Turner & Townsend forecasts Singapore construction cost inflation at 4 percent in 2026 as AI data centre demand strains contractors and skilled labour. Asia Pacific had 4.8GW of capacity under construction in the first half of 2026, and every one of those projects is competing for the same electrical, HVAC, project management and commissioning engineers.

The US picture explains why the pressure is political. A study published in Nature Sustainability on 16 November examined 403 US hyperscale facilities operating between May 2024 and April 2025. The central estimate was 82 TWh of electricity, about 1.8 percent of total US electricity use, with 25.7 million metric tons of CO2 attributable to that consumption. At that scale, grid access stops being a commercial negotiation and becomes a public policy question. Norway is simply the first to say so out loud.

Efficiency buys capacity, but not permission

One response is to get more compute out of the same connection. The arithmetic is real. At a PUE of 1.25, a 100MW facility delivers 80MW of IT load and carries 20MW of infrastructure overhead. At 1.10, the same 100MW delivers 90.9MW of IT load against 9.1MW of overhead. That is roughly 11MW of additional IT capacity, about 14 percent more usable computing power, from the same facility power budget and no additional grid connection.

Direct-to-chip liquid cooling is what makes those numbers reachable on high-density AI workloads. But liquid cooling does not automatically deliver a PUE of 1.10. Actual performance depends on climate, cooling design and operating conditions, and in a tropical siting it depends heavily on water. Malaysia's two-day storage requirement is a signal of where that argument goes next.

Efficiency changes what you can sell from a connection you already hold. It does nothing for a project that cannot get one.

Where this leaves Indonesia

The honest case for Indonesia is not that it has fewer rules. Its draft threshold of 3MW is considerably lower than Thailand's 20MW, which means it would catch far more projects, and the US chip licence requirement applies to Indonesia exactly as it does to its neighbours.

The case is different, and it is about what the rules ask you to do.

The Indonesian draft is a siting rule, not a cap. Placing facilities of 3MW and above in special economic zones or industrial estates directs projects to where substations, water supply and fibre already exist. That is where any serious hyperscale project was going anyway. Compare that with a grid operator suspending new reservations outright, or with a market where only 20MW is under construction against a far larger pipeline.

Land and scale still exist. Industrially zoned land in sufficient contiguous parcels, with room for multi-building campuses and adjacent expansion, is the thing the mature markets have exhausted. It is the reason the hyperscale corridor moved east.

Domestic demand underwrites it. Regulated sectors, particularly banking and financial services, generally must keep data centres and disaster recovery onshore unless OJK approves otherwise. That is a floor under Indonesian capacity that does not depend on export markets or on where the chips are allowed to go.

The caveats are the ones I have written about before and they have not changed. PLN interconnection runs three to five years and the constraint sits in transmission rather than generation. Water belongs in site selection, not detailed design. A signed land deal without a realistic energisation date is an option, not a data centre.

What to do with this

For owners of industrial land, the draft siting rule is the thing to read closely. If it lands as drafted, land inside a special economic zone or an established industrial estate becomes categorically different from land outside one, and the difference is binary rather than a matter of degree.

For investors and developers, the diligence question has shifted. It is no longer only whether a site has power. It is which approval regime the project sits inside, what that regime asks for, how long it takes, and whether the chips the tenant intends to install can lawfully arrive.

Capital is available. Compute demand is not in doubt. What is scarce is a site where you can actually get permission, on a timeline you can underwrite. If you are evaluating a site or a corridor, that is the question worth starting from.

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